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Abstract 
This paper provides a comprehensive theoretical and empirical literature review of venture 
capital contracts. The paper outlines differences between theoretical and practical uses of con-
tract designs, that is, (1) how does the choice of securities give rise to different adverse selec-
tion problems in terms of attracting different types of entrepreneurial companies; How does 
the choice of securities in conjunction with cash flow and control rights provisions affect (2) 
the effort levels by the entrepreneur and the investor; and (3) ultimately affect entrepreneurial 
outcomes. The paper highlights the major discrepancies between theory and practice and 
points out potential avenues for further research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Investments by venture capital (VC) companies in prospective and promising 
entrepreneurial firms give rise to pronounced principal–agent conflicts. These conflicts 
emanate from substantial information asymmetries as well as behavioral uncertainties related 
to the interaction with the investment target (e.g., Amit et al., 1998), which shape the detailed 
contracts used to govern the relationship over the life of the investment (e.g., Cumming & 
Johan, 2009). Research on VC contracting covers the investment life cycle, i.e., selection, 
appraisal, contracting, monitoring and exiting of target companies. This research has yielded a 
large body of literature addressing how contract design can cope with the unique agency-
theoretic features of the relationship between VCs and their portfolio companies. However, 
due to the relative opaqueness of the VC industry, early research focused on self-reported 
surveys with inherent selection and reporting biases. Available empirical support is relatively 
sparse (though increasing) and highlights several discrepancies between theoretical design 
principles and contracting choices observed in VC practice (e.g., Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003; 
Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004; Cumming, 2006; Cumming & Johan, 2009). 
 The purpose of this paper is to comprehensively review the theoretical literature 
alongside the practical use of different contract design features by VCs to answer the 
following three questions: (1) How does the choice of securities (i.e., common equity, 
preferred equity, convertible preferred equity, debt, convertible debt, and mixes of these 
securities)1 give rise to different adverse selection problems in terms of attracting different 
types of entrepreneurial companies? How does the choice of securities in conjunction with 
cash flow and control rights provisions (2) affect the effort levels of entrepreneur and investor 
and (3) ultimately shape entrepreneurial outcomes? 
                                                 
1
 Refer to Table 1 for definitions of these terms 
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With regard to the first question, VCs apply enhanced screening and monitoring skills 
as well as superior industry expertise to mitigate agency problems2 in the investment 
relationship with entrepreneurial firms. Given that agency problems differ across 
entrepreneurial firms, contracting choices are expected to include an appropriately designed 
capital structure (i.e., selection of financing vehicle) to mitigate their perceived influence on 
investment performance (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This is in line with  theoretical 
work on capital structure and selection effects, which outlines how using different securities is 
linked to different types of adverse selection risk and different types of entrepreneurial firms: 
Equity attracts firms with low expected returns; debt financing attracts those with high 
variability in returns (e.g., Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Cumming & Johan, 2009);  and convertible 
securities attract those with low variability in returns (e.g., Brennan & Kraus, 1987; Cumming 
& Johan, 2009). 
A growing body of empirical research on capital structure and selection effects in the 
VC industry however shows mixed support for the achievements of the theoretical literature 
(see Table 2). One major strand shows convertible securities to be uniquely optimal for 
venture capital (e.g., Gompers, 1997; Gompers & Lerner, 2001). Another strand provides a 
diverse picture of the securities used (e.g., Cumming, 2006). The latter shows that, besides 
economic agency costs explanations, more theoretical and empirical work is required that is 
context dependent, and that explores the effect of other factors such as differences in tax 
regimes, institutional differences and market conditions (e.g., Gilson & Schizer, 2003; Kaplan 
& Stromberg, 2003; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004; Cumming, 2006; Cumming & Johan, 2009). 
Concerning the second question, moral hazard risks associated with the entrepreneur’s 
role as a contracting agent are well outlined: (1) the entrepreneur’s unwillingness to expend 
                                                 
2See Berger and Udell (1998), Bergmann and Hege (1998), Chan (1983), Casamatta (2003), Casamatta and 
Haritchabalet (2007), De Clercq and Sapienza (2001), Gompers and Lerner (1999), Kanniainen and Keuschnigg 
(2003, 2004), Manigart, Sapienza and Vermeir (1996), Manigart et al., (2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c), Mayer, 
Schoors and Yafeh (2005), Sapienza (1992), Trester (1998) and Wright and Lockett (2003). 
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value-maximizing effort after VC funds are committed, or (2) the potential of extracting 
informational rents from knowing more about her own quality/ability than the VC, or (3) 
having the leverage of threatening to leave when human capital is particularly valuable to the 
firm, or (4) being in control of the venture project with no prospect of intervention in the 
event of disagreement with the VC investors (e.g., Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004). Predicted 
theoretical remedies – using performance-sensitive compensation (e.g., Holstrom, 1979; 
Lazear, 1986), investor liquidation rights (Ross, 1977; Diamond, 1991), specifying 
contingency-based control rights (e.g., Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994; 
Dessein, 2002), and vesting rights (Hart & Moore, 1994)3 – have only just begun to be 
empirically tested with hand-collected data samples and more direct proxy measures of risk 
(e.g., Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004). As it turns out, the theoretical predictions regarding 
generic moral hazard risks faced by VCs and how they are mitigated have found mixed 
empirical support (e.g., Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004). Empirical testing has however yielded 
interesting new avenues of inquiry, such as the optimality of contract implementation, the 
influence of institutional context, and the relative bargaining power of VC and entrepreneur in 
the deployment of financial instruments and supplementary contract provisions (e.g., Inderst 
& Muller, 2004). 
Finally, the third question involving the contractual specification of exit rights for VC 
and the firm’s founders is an important issue used to solve or at least mitigate exit-related 
hold-up problems. Indeed, conflicts of interest often arise when the VC decides to divest from 
a well-performing venture, typically either via an initial public offering (IPO) or a trade sale 
(acquisition). First, the entrepreneur may oppose the VC’s exit decision to protect the private 
(control) benefits from being an owner–manager (Hellmann, 1998), which can be especially 
relevant in the context of a projected trade sale (Black and Gilson, 1998). Moreover, VCs 
usually have more interest in a sale than the entrepreneur, since the VC must return the cash 
                                                 
3
 Refer to Table 1 for a comprehensive outline and definitions of key types of rights  
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flows from disinvestment to the VC investors within a given time period (Gompers & Lerner, 
1998). Neither theoretical nor empirical work seems to have fully incorporated relative 
bargaining power, the role of the legal regime and other context variables, all of which should 
enhance our understanding of observed contracting behavior (e.g., Cumming & Johan, 2009). 
While other contributions, in particular Fried and Hisrich (1988), Wright and Robbie 
(1998), Gompers and Lerner (2001), Wright et al. (2005), and Da Rin et al. (2013), merely 
touch upon contracting issues in the context of more general reviews, our objective is to 
critically evaluate the achievements of the theoretical contracting literature in the presence of 
the existing empirical evidence in much greater detail and with respect to specific 
entrepreneurship issues. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                --------------------------------- 
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide a review of each of the three main 
research questions as posed above, and for each question, we then juxtapose theoretical and 
empirical research to identify potential inconsistencies and avenues for further research. The 
final section concludes with a summary of our findings and provides an outlook into potential 
future research. 
REVIEW OF VC CONTRACTING LITERATURE AND ITS LINK TO 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 
Choice of Securities and the Type of Entrepreneurial Company 
In this section, we review research on the question of how the choice of financial 
instruments gives rise to adverse selection problems in terms of attracting different types of 
entrepreneurs. The extent of adverse selection problems, i.e., the degree of information 
asymmetry and agency costs faced by the VC firm, are not uniform across different types of 
entrepreneurial firms. Work on this problem follows three streams: (1) the seminal (and Nobel 
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prize winning) work that explains why different offers of securities attract different types of 
firm (or entrepreneur types) (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; DeMeza 
& Webb, 1987; 1992); (2) theoretical work that suggests how security design can be adjusted 
to appropriately mitigate agency problems; and (3) empirical studies of how contract design is 
applied in practice. We will first focus on the seminal and theoretical literature on securities 
choice and the choice of entrepreneurial firm types, followed by a review of the relevant 
empirical work. 
Theoretical Literature on Securities Choice and Entrepreneurial Firm Types 
Early work notes that entrepreneurial firms with low expected returns (identified as 
‘lemons’ in the finance literature) are attracted to common equity because they face low 
opportunity costs of giving up ownership (e.g., DeMeza & Webb, 1987; 1992). At the same 
time, entrepreneurial firms with high variability in returns (and therefore vast potential 
upswings in value) face relatively high opportunity costs of giving up ownership are  attracted 
to (non-convertible) debt and preferred equity (e.g., Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Convertible 
securities appeal to firms with low variability in returns (Brennan & Kraus, 1987). The cited 
studies highlight that agency problems differ across firms and imply entrepreneurial firms will 
prefer different contract offers depending on their different risk/return profile. In light of this 
observation, researchers note that securities can be designed within contracts to appropriately 
mitigate agency problems based on the specific characteristics of the firm seeking financing 
(e.g., Cumming & Johan, 2009). 
Building on this early finance literature, two literature streams emerged focusing on 
venture capital finance in particular: the first (and quite vast) stream characterizes convertible 
preferred securities as the optimal form of financing for entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Chan, 
1983; Amit et al., 1990; Berglöf, 1994; Bergmann & Hege, 1998; Gompers, 1997; Marx, 
1998; Trester, 1998; Casamatta, 2003; Schmidt, 2003), while a second stream suggests that 
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convertible securities are not uniquely optimal (e.g., Barney et al., 1994; Landstrom et al., 
1998; Manigart et al., 2002; Cumming, 2006; Cumming & Johan, 2009). 
Early contributions favored fixed-fraction contracts. These are equity-like positions 
providing the VC with the same payoff proportion after each new round of investment. This 
contract type therefore helps to avoid potential mispricing and solve hidden information 
problems (e.g., Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994). Another early proposal was the implementation 
of debt-equity mixes that grant VCs the contractual right to intervene in order to improve the 
entrepreneurial firm’s prospects for success, but only insofar as the previously hidden 
information concerning the venture’s success potential becomes visible (Marx, 1998). 
Subsequent research analyzed securities choice in the context of a staged financing 
framework (e.g., Cornelli & Yosha, 2002). Similar to previous work, staged-financing models 
demonstrated the superiority of convertible securities over any combination of debt and equity 
by giving investors the opportunity to abandon the project when it is efficient to do so. It was 
further shown that staging can also mitigate excessive risk-taking by entrepreneurs since 
outside investors are provided with an option to obtain a share of the firm, thereby reducing 
the entrepreneur’s payoff stake (e.g., Green, 1983). Staging can also help to address adverse 
selection and double moral hazard problems by conditioning the allocation of the cash flow 
and control rights on the contracting parties’ effort and information revelation, thereby 
inducing the transacting parties to convey information truthfully and to implement efficient 
effort levels (e.g., Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Houben, 2002; Schmidt, 2003). 
 The staging literature has a number of assumptions in common, namely: (1) 
Asymmetric information exists solely between the entrepreneur and the outside capital 
market, (2) VC companies are better informed than outside investors are, (3) VC companies 
observe the same information as the entrepreneur and, hence, no informational asymmetries 
prevail at the inception stage of the project. The latter part of assumption (3) is not very likely 
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to hold in reality. Nearly all other papers assume information asymmetries between VC 
investors and founders. 
Empirical Literature on Securities Choice and Entrepreneurial Firm Types 
Empirical results using U.S. data leave little room for doubt that convertible preferred 
equity is the major financing instrument chosen by the VC industry. In fact, convertible 
preferred equity is employed nearly exclusively in VC investments: 100% of a sample of 
1,534 investment rounds in Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011); 100% of a small sample of 27 
financing rounds in Sahlman (1990); at least 80% of a survey study among eight VC firm 
principals by Trester (1998); and 94.5% of a study examining first-hand data from 200 
investment contracts by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) (see Table 2 below for a summary of 
these key papers). The cited studies are far from representative and suffer from 
methodological bias4 (with the possible exception of Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011). However, 
they at least deliver a broad picture of the U.S. VC market. 
Given this very one-sided picture, Gilson and Schizer (2003) offer a tax-related 
explanation for the frequent use of convertible preferred stock that applies only to the United 
States. Companies issuing convertible preferred equity are able to offer favorable tax 
treatment on their incentive compensation payments to employees (most notably, the 
founder). Such employees are then able to defer income taxes until after they divest from 
these holdings, presumably at a time when their marginal tax rate is significantly lower. As 
incentive efficiency is a central aspect of venture capital finance, the authors conclude that 
this effect represents a central purpose for using convertible preferred equity and explains the 
remarkable similarity of capital structures in U.S. venture finance. 
                                                 
4
 For example, Trester (1998) assumes a sample of 800 total investments, evenly distributed among the surveyed 
VCs. Also, the response bias of survey studies is problematic—especially considering the low number of total 
responses. 
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Accordingly, the overall picture in other countries is substantially more diverse. In a 
number of studies outside the US, convertible securities ranked behind either straight equity, 
silent partnerships, or debt-equity mixes (e.g., Bascha & Walz, 2002; Hommel, et al, 2003).  
Studies of investments of European VC funds (e.g., Bottazzi et al., 2004; Bottazzi et al., 
2009; Cumming, 2008; Schwienbacher, 2008; Hege et al., 2009) and studies of investments in 
Canadian ventures (e.g., Cumming, 2005a; 2005b) find a very heterogeneous picture 
regarding both, the choice of financial instrument as well as the distribution of cash flow and 
control rights. Common stock is used more than convertible preferred equity, followed by 
mixed debt-equity and straight debt or straight preferred debt. Interestingly, US VCs hardly 
finance their Canadian portfolio firms with convertible preferred equity. This phenomenon is 
attributed to differences in capital gains taxation (e.g., Cumming, 2005a; 2005b). According 
to these studies, the securities choice explanation relates above all to the nature and extent of 
agency problems rather than to different financial structures being used as functional 
equivalents. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Generally confirming the heterogeneous picture generated with international samples, 
Kaplan, et al. (2007) employ a very diversified international sample and find that, while the 
majority of their investments are in fact financed with convertible preferred equity (53.8%), 
this remains much less common than in the U.S., where it is applied almost exclusively. 
These authors identify differences attributable to legal regime, but also note that experienced 
VCs appear able to implement U.S.-style contracts everywhere. Their findings indicate the 
efficiency of U.S. contracting, as well as the presence of learning effects from growing VC 
experience over time. 
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When one considers U.S.-focused empirical studies, the predominance of convertible 
securities as the optimal financing instrument does not appear consistent with the postulations 
of early seminal work, which finds that different contract offers attract different types of 
entrepreneurial firms. A possible reason is that U.S.-based studies consider VCs as early-stage 
investors, which according to Cumming and Johan (2009) is arguably a narrow view of VC 
activity overall. It also masks the differences among entrepreneurial firms within the early-
stage sector. Early-stage-focused VCs select companies characterized in terms of stage of 
development, i.e., in the seed, startup or expansion phase of development.5 Other 
characterizations include experience of the entrepreneur, industry growth and the dependence 
on new technologies. 
Which financing instrument one expects to be associated with the seed and startup 
stages depends on the agency costs present for that context. Cumming and Johan (2009) 
provide a cogent summary of the arguments (p. 305). They argue that adverse selection costs 
are significant for startup and expansion-stage firms due to the significant presence of 
systematic, unsystematic, and informational risk. In addition, moral hazard costs are high for 
startup firms because of the malleable nature of their assets, which provides entrepreneurs 
with greater discretion for extracting private benefits. Consistent with these arguments, a 
greater reliance on convertible preferred equity is observed. 
Additionally, investing in high-technology entrepreneurial firms exposes VCs to larger 
agency costs than non-tech firms. Three factors account for this: First, the significant presence 
of intangible assets adds to the difficulty of determining firm value; second, a high degree of 
asset specificity impairs the collateral value of these assets and; third, the unique skill set of 
target company management permits the extraction of managerial rents (e.g., Hart & Moore, 
                                                 
5
 As opposed to later-stage investors, VCs typically invest in pre-profit or even pre-revenue development stages 
and accompany product conception, early production, marketing, and market expansion. For an overview and 
definition of different investment stages, refer to, for example, Sahlman (1990) and Gompers (1995). Cumming 
and Johan (2009) suggest that this is a narrow view of venture capital and propose to include buyouts and turna-
rounds as well. 
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1994; Noe & Rebello, 1996). As such, high-tech ventures are expected to make greater use of 
convertible securities, while non–technology-based entrepreneurial firms are assumed to 
attract a greater percentage of non-convertible financing. 
Empirically, the use of convertible securities is not confined to early-stage investments 
or high-technology firms – the findings are decidedly mixed. Some researchers have 
suggested that VCs may be able to implement similar cash flow rights allocations by using 
combinations of straight preferred and straight common stock (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). 
Several instruments or instrument combinations are perceived as substitutes in most models. 
Cumming (2001) identifies three major groups of functionally equivalent securities: straight 
debt and straight preferred equity, straight common stock and warrants, and all ‘convertible-
preferred-like’ securities. Other research also shows that, for a given security, different uses 
of contract provisions (cumulative dividends, liquidation preference, etc.) can achieve a 
functionally similar payoff for the investor (e.g., Metric & Yasuda, 2010; Bengtsson, 2011). It 
is important to note in this context that debt-equity mixes are for instance functionally 
equivalent to convertibles in some models (Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Marx, 1998), while in 
others they are not (Berglof, 1994; Cornelli & Yosha, 2002; Schmidt, 2003). 
As explained above, tax regime differences drive much of the adoption rate for 
convertible securities, in the US in particular. Cumming and Johan (2009) proffer two other 
explanations: (1) institutional – the adoption rate is positively influenced by investor 
sophistication and the familiarity with non-vanilla financing instruments; (2) variations in 
stock market conditions – unfavorable stock market conditions are likely to drive up the use 
of financing instruments with downside protection features. Additionally, there appears to be 
a strong carry-over learning effect with VCs likely to employ contractual terms with which 
they are familiar with from earlier investments (e.g., Bengtsson & Bernhardt, 2011). While 
the overall conclusion about the dominance of agency factors in explaining contractual 
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differences remains valid, mixed empirical findings provide avenues for future research to 
study the explanatory value of other factors. 
Finally, a number of contributions examine how the relative bargaining power of 
entrepreneur and VC, e.g. proxied by experience, affects contracts and allocation of cash flow 
as well as control rights. Cumming and Johan (2008) show on the basis of their European 
sample that more experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to finance themselves with 
common equity and correspondingly less likely to employ convertible preferred equity. VCs 
represent the mirror image with investment experience being positively related to the use of 
convertible preferred equity and negatively related to the use of common equity. These results 
are also consistent with Kaplan et al. (2007) and Hsu (2004), who show that investor 
sophistication leads to more favorable deal terms, which entrepreneurs willingly grant in 
exchange for their affiliation with more reputed financing partners.  
Moreover, Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) find that more experienced VCs make less use 
of contractual clauses protecting returns on the downside. This result suggests that VCs with 
better governance abilities are trying to avoid clauses involving costs of risk sharing and focus 
more on influencing venture development, e.g. by negotiating more far-reaching board 
representation rights.  
We will now proceed to discuss how contract design can affect entrepreneurial effort. 
We first provide an overview of the issues involved in contract design and entrepreneurial 
effort. We then discuss the theoretical and empirical literature on cash flow allocation 
followed by the theoretical and empirical literature on control rights.  
 
Securities Selection, Cash Flow and Control Rights and Entrepreneurial Effort 
After the investment decision, VCs incur unique risks specific to investing in 
entrepreneurial companies that result in further agency costs. VCs and entrepreneurs have 
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potentially diverging interests, stemming from imbalanced financing structures6 and the fact 
that the latter associate substantial non-monetary benefits with their role in the company and 
with the existence of the company as a whole.7 This can motivate the entrepreneur to make 
decisions against the VC’s best interests and to engage in ‘window dressing’ activities, 
biasing the venture’s short-term performance. 
Venture capital contracts must account for this discrepancy and must adapt with regard 
to the parties’ major goals. The entrepreneur wants the possibility of flexible future expansion 
and medium- to long-term control over the company to retain the above-mentioned benefits. 
The VC is primarily motivated monetarily, aspires to the highest possible return, and seeks 
contractual downside protection. Further, VCs want the option to take control of the company 
in case of poor performance, and full control of their own exit in case the venture develops 
positively. Contracts therefore must encompass a range of eventualities unique to venture 
financing, especially regarding the venture’s various lifecycle stages and its expected degree 
of development over time. Efficient contract design can help to align the incentives of VCs 
and the entrepreneur, thereby limiting opportunistic behavior on the part of the latter and, as a 
consequence, value destruction of the VC’s investment. 
The allocation of cash flow rights between the two contracting parties is supposed to 
secure the VC an attractive return on investment, while still providing sufficient pecuniary 
incentives for optimal exertion of effort on the part of the entrepreneur.8 This can be achieved 
                                                 
6
 For example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) argue that the decision whether to continue the company’s opera-
tions is implicitly made by the better informed entrepreneur, whose option-like payoff structure (limited loss, but 
high participation in potential gains) encourages him to overinvest and to continue projects that should rather be 
abandoned on the basis of a narrow discounted cash flow calculus. 
7
 According to Bergemann and Hege (1998) this misalignment can also in turn lead to potential moral hazard 
problems, as the entrepreneur may divert funds and effort to serve his private benefits, still unobservable to the 
investor.  
8
 Cash-flow–related covenants are generally intended to secure the VC’s financial stakes. They are applied as a 
downside protection for the VC to prevent a dilution or reduction of his investment value and as a measure to 
maintain control over the constitution and duration of his share in the portfolio firm. To restrain their initial in-
vestment amount, VCs apply staged financing and thereby refuse to commit the entire amount all at once by 
making cash flows conditional on the achievement of specific milestones. To manage their financial claims after 
total capital infusion, conversion options regulate the conditional type of claim and, for example, enable a swap 
between debt and equity stakes, respectively, between a fixed high-order claim in case of distress and a partici-
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with a proper mix of financing instruments, executive compensation, and cash flow 
contingencies in the form of milestones. 
While a founder’s base salary in venture capital–backed companies tends to be 
relatively low (e.g., Wasserman, 2006), total compensation can be significant and is very 
sensitive to firm performance, for instance due to the inclusion of equity options (e.g., Baker 
& Gompers, 1999). Pre-revenue financing rounds also make greater use of vesting provisions 
to ensure that the founder stays on board (e.g., Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003). 
The allocation of cash flow rights is generally more important for the management of 
the founder’s incentives than the compensation structure, mainly because of the larger impact 
on total wealth. It involves the mix of financing instruments supplemented with additional 
contract features assigning cash flow rights to the contracting parties. The distribution can be 
made either independent of (straight debt or equity) or dependent (convertible instruments) on 
project success by security choice alone. It can further be enhanced by staging capital 
infusions into the portfolio firm and by making them contingent on fulfillment of specified 
performance goals. In this way, the VC can not only abandon projects that fall short of initial 
expectations, but can also structure the founder’s incentives of effort provision. Such goals 
often include financial performance targets, but may also correspond to the achievement of 
operational milestones such as the development of a prototype, a successful patent filing, or 
market entry. 
Theoretical Literature on Cash Flow Rights Allocation: Staging 
Theoretical models of the implied hold-up problem demonstrate how staging can 
improve venture performance. First, it increases the likelihood of the entrepreneur obtaining 
future investments. As the entrepreneur is building up firm-specific capital over time, the 
likelihood of his withdrawal becomes less likely (Neher, 1999). Second, staging includes a 
                                                                                                                                                        
pating claim on high returns. Other such covenants protect minimal financial interests in cases of liquidation or 
distress (liquidation rights, dividend provisions). 
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value-enhancing real option of terminating the investment as uncertainty resolves itself 
(exit/put option) (Bigus, 2006). Third, staging represents a complementary mechanism to 
reduce agency cost (in situations where the entrepreneur’s effort is unverifiable) and 
investment risk. It therefore ensures the funding of ventures, which would have otherwise 
been rejected by VCs in an all-or-nothing setting (Wang and Zhou, 2004). While all these 
theoretical treatments generate valuable insights on the potential benefits of dividing venture 
finance into a contingent sequence of smaller investments, the assumptions of these models 
remain questionable, especially with regard to the presence of symmetric information and the 
certainty about the project’s outcome given continuous provision of both founder effort and 
VC funding (Neher, 1999). 
The theoretical literature also reveals potential downsides of staging, namely that it may 
cause VCs to underinvest in promising projects or to abandon non-promising projects too 
early, implying a loss in social welfare (Wang and Zhou, 2004). In legal domains with low 
levels of property right protection, staging exposes the entrepreneur to a potential breach of 
trust with the VC threatening to transfer the venture’s intellectual property to another party.  
This will induce the entrepreneur to reduce non-contractible effort. Wang and Zhou (2004) 
among others have however shown that high-powered cash flow incentives can prevent 
investor opportunism, which goes beyond the reduction of moral hazard discussed in earlier 
work.9 In particular, binding long-term contracts can mitigate the VC hold-up problem by 
conditioning the investor’s cash flows on the venture’s financial performance over time or the 
fulfillment of operational milestones in the previous stage.  
Empirical Literature on Cash Flow Rights Allocation: Staging 
The insights provided by the theoretical literature are largely confirmed by empirical 
findings. Staging does lead to a discontinuation of investments after the receipt of negative 
                                                 
9
 In addition to the studies above, Sahlman (199) already finds staged investments, connected with the option to 
abandon, to primarily mitigate moral hazard by entrepreneurs. 
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informational updates about a portfolio firm’s future development potential and profit 
prospects. VCs appear to also vary the intensity of monitoring with the magnitude of agency 
costs and therefore subject early-stage investments to more on-going scrutiny (Gompers, 
1995). In addition, the state-contingency of cash flow rights generally appears to be a 
common feature in US venture capital contracting (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003). 
 More recently, researchers have begun to address the question of how staged financing 
should be optimally implemented. Two studies in particular examine different scenarios in 
which either milestone or round financing is better suited.10 They link staging to the perceived 
importance of either investor or entrepreneurial effort (Cuny & Talmor, 2005) and the 
reduction in contract completeness as well as the distribution of bargaining power between 
the contracting parties (Bienz & Hirsch, 2006). Further empirical work is needed to test the 
assumptions of these models, i.e., that milestone financing is more efficient if VC effort is 
very important, or whether VC and entrepreneurial effort are equally important in the 
presence of either heterogeneous expectations or a VC preference for liquidity, and how 
efficiency of type of funding relates to different venture types in terms of technology risk. 
The relationship between staged financing and monitoring warrants further attention in 
empirical work as well. Tian (2011) has found based on a U.S. dataset that staging serves as a 
compensatory mechanisms for coping with the downsides of geographical distance between 
VC and portfolio firm.  It would be particularly interesting to explore whether this finding can 
be confirmed when considering VC investments crossing national boundaries, legal regimes 
(case law vs. common law countries) and cultural spheres.  
We will now discuss the theoretical and empirical literature on control rights and its 
impact on entrepreneurial effort. 
                                                 
10
 While VCs under milestone financing already commit to payment of additional tranches ex ante (conditional 
on specific performance goals), round financing implies no fixed VC commitment. Still, the entrepreneur can 
reasonably expect the VC to participate in subsequent financing rounds once such goals are met. 
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Control Rights 
Through a combination of instrument choice and (control-related) covenants, VCs are 
able to separate the allocation of cash flow and control rights. Adhering to their role as active 
contributors of risk capital, VCs use (co-)decision and veto rights to influence the strategic 
direction of the venture (e.g., via board membership) (see Table 1 for a comprehensive outline 
and definitions of veto rights and board rights). They typically have the ability to enforce or 
block management and board decisions, even after the contract has been signed. VCs 
contribute their own resources and expertise to the development of the portfolio firm and pro-
actively protect their stake against potentially harmful disagreements with the founder. They 
intensify their influence when the venture is not performing well by making the distribution of 
control rights contingent on measures of the venture’s financial or non-financial performance. 
Theoretical Literature on Control Rights Allocation 
According to theoretical literature, VCs bundle a risky claim with disproportionate 
control rights and, in addition, include control shifting covenants in their contracts (Chan, et 
al, 1990) independent of cash flow rights (Kirilenko, 2001).11 If the venture meets 
performance expectations, the entrepreneur remains in control and receives performance-
contingent compensation.12 Control rights matter given that contracts are incomplete and not 
all potential conflicts of interest can be resolved ex ante. Information asymmetries imply that 
a wealth-constrained entrepreneur maximizing his private benefit function may engage in 
opportunistic behavior, which is not aligned with the interest of a return-oriented financial 
investor with time-limited commitment. Control rights define a “pecking-order” of 
governance regimes, which can move the venture from full entrepreneur control to contingent 
                                                 
11
 All other papers to this point assume control to be a binary or categorical (founder, joint and VC control) vari-
able. Kirilenko (2001) introduces the concept of continuous control (e.g., referring to voting rights).  
12
 Tykvova (2007) points out that several of the authors’ assumptions are rather questionable. First, the first-
period cash flow should not commonly prove the entrepreneurial skills of the founder. Second, Chan et al. 
(1990) imply that control is costly for both parties. Most other papers assume private benefits of control for the 
founder instead. 
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control to full VC control depending on the VC’s perceived need of protecting its financial 
interests (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994). 
VCs commonly seek comprehensive control rights beyond those implied in the 
financing relationship. They for instance often include the right to appoint the CEO and other 
members of the management board (Hellman, 1998). Entrepreneurs agree to relinquish 
control if it enhances the VC’s effort in identifying value-enhancing professional 
management, for instance in response to poor founder performance. Entrepreneurs are also 
more willing to relinquish control the smaller their own equity stake, the tighter their own 
wealth constraint, and the higher the expected quality of external management. Contracts are 
by definition incomplete and may leave some enforceable future transaction unspecified. 
Attempting to predetermine which party de facto has the final say for such transactions, i.e., 
thinking about how to complete the contract and how to outwit the counterparty, may create 
costs in excess of the expected benefits (Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2010). 
Empirical Literature on Control Rights Allocation 
Empirical research investigating control rights dynamics finds that, as predicted by 
theory, VCs attain more control (e.g., increasing VC board involvement after a CEO 
replacement) in portfolio firms with low performance (Lerner, 1995). It has also been shown 
that VCs implement covenants to allocate control independent from cash flow rights 
(Gompers, 1997; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003) and that the use of control covenants increases 
with agency costs. It is particularly intensive for early-stage and R&D–intensive portfolio 
firms (Gompers, 1997) as well as pre-revenue firms (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). The use 
of control covenants also appears sensitive to the degree of potential conflict of interest 
perceived in the contracting relationship (e.g., Bengtsson, 2011). 
In addition, VC board involvement correlates positively with geographic proximity to 
the portfolio firm (Lerner, 1995; Bengtsson & Ravid, 2011). This finding challenges the 
 20 
assumed dominant homogeneity of U.S.-style contract provisions and has not been fully 
captured by the theoretical literature as well.13 
In the next section, we discuss the theoretical and empirical literature on how contract 
design can affect VC effort.   
 
Contract Design and VC Effort 
A unique feature in the VC-entrepreneur relationship results from the role of VCs as 
active investors, which ideally goes far beyond the traditional principal–agent context. 
Considering the potentially limited managerial experience of (first-time) entrepreneurs, VC 
effort can be essential for the achievement of investment success. More recent theoretical 
models consider a double moral hazard scenario,14 in which the VC provides input in the form 
of monitoring (Lerner, 1995) and managerial advice (e.g., related to firm strategy, financial 
policy, negotiation with suppliers or customers, leveraging industry connections, 
establishment of organizational structures, recruitment of key personnel) (e.g., Gompers & 
Lerner, 1998; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). Casamatta (2003) even views the efforts of 
entrepreneur and VC as substitutes, albeit with varying efficiency. Assuming that both forms 
of effort are unobservable, this author assesses the effectiveness of different financing 
instruments in providing incentives via a more effective allocation of cash flow rights.15 
Early empirical work on VC effort used measures such as the frequency of face-to-face 
interaction (e.g., Sapienza et al., 1996) or the actual hours expended by the VC (Gorman & 
Sahlman, 1989) to highlight how VCs add value to the portfolio company. These 
contributions do not however include the effect of VC effort exerted via financing contracts. 
                                                 
13
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this reference. 
14
 Cp., for example, Schmidt (2003), who precludes that VC commitment has a direct impact on the success of 
high-potential ventures and can also not be contractually fixed, especially because the necessary amount of effort 
is usually unknown ex ante. Therefore, it should be taken into account when modeling this relationship. 
15
 Also, Repullo and Suarez (2004) recognize a “complementarity between the provision of financing and ad-
vice” by the VC and observe a double-sided moral hazard problem. These authors extend the model of Schmidt 
(2003) to also capture staged financing. 
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Subsequent work accounted for this aspect by including effort proxies for advice and 
monitoring, mostly in the form of dummy variables (e.g., Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). Work 
that is more recent examines contracts in relation to actual hours of VC effort expended (e.g., 
Cumming & Johan, 2007). One of the key findings is that VC effort positively co-varies with 
the magnitude of cash flow and control rights held by the VC. Specifically, VC intervention 
becomes more likely as VC control increases, while the provision of value-added services and 
advice increases with the VCs equity stake (e.g., Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004; Cumming & 
Johan, 2007). The conclusions are however based on small datasets so that there is a need for 
further confirmatory work.16 
We will now proceed to discuss the theoretical and empirical literature on how contract 
design can affect outcomes.  
 
Contract Design and Entrepreneurial Outcomes 
Hold-up problems by both VCs and entrepreneurs may arise for a number of inter-
related reasons: (1) contractual incompleteness implying that important variables must be 
omitted from the contract because they are difficult or even impossible to describe initially; 
(2) differences in objectives between entrepreneur and VC; and (3) the long-term nature of the 
relationship. While entrepreneurs are interested in securing the benefits from venture success 
under a contractual regime with shared control (e.g., Fried & Ganor, 2006), VCs want to limit 
the entrepreneurs’ ability to consume the investment in the form of private benefits (e.g., 
Casamatta, 2003; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003; Schmidt, 2003). 
The allocation of control rights and decision rights, in particular exit provisions (see 
Table 1 for an outline and definitions of exit rights), are used to resolve or at least mitigate 
hold-up problems related to the termination of the investment. Theoretical treatments have 
                                                 
16
 We thank the editor for this suggestion. 
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employed dimensions of security design and control rights (e.g., Aghion & Bolton, 1992; 
Berglöf, 1994; Bascha & Walz, 2001; Neus & Walz, 2005; Hellman, 2006) to consider the 
contractual implications of a successful exit, which may involve an initial public offering 
(IPO) or an acquisition (trade sale) (e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Gompers & Lerner, 1999). Other 
exit types, such as buybacks, secondary sales, or liquidations are generally not considered 
optimal outcomes for the VC (e.g., Cumming & Johan, 2009). 
Exit-related rationalizations of security choice for instance deal with the use of 
convertible preferred equity, which allocates cash flow rights differently for IPOs and trade 
sales due to an automatic conversion clause, which typically comes alive in the case of an 
IPO.17 An IPO exit normally requires the VC to maintain its equity stake until the end of the 
lock-up period. In this case, both parties’ effort levels remain important going forward and the 
underlying double moral hazard problem is best resolved with pure equity. After a trade sale, 
however, the acquirer assumes control, so the distribution of cash flows becomes the only 
relevant issue. As automatic conversion provisions do not come into effect in this case, the 
VC maintains its senior claim for the remaining equity stake (e.g., Hellman, 2006). 
Empirically, preplanned acquisitions are found to be more likely to be associated with 
convertible securities than common equity (e.g., Cumming & Johan, 2009). 
Because the entrepreneur derives private benefits from being an owner-manager 
(Hellmann, 1998), she may resist an exit decision in which control benefits are lost. This is 
likely to be the case in a trade sale (Black & Gilson, 1998). Moreover, VCs usually have more 
interest in a sale than the entrepreneur does, since they must return the cash flows from 
disinvestment to their investors (Gompers & Lerner, 1998). These differences in motives and 
objectives give rise to possible conflicts of interest and cause the literature to differentiate 
between preplanned exits and actual exits. Preplanned exits describe the VC’s initial choice of 
                                                 
17
 Gompers (1997) analyzes only convertible preferred agreements and finds that 92% of contracts include an 
automatic conversion clause for initial public offerings.  
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exit channel, typically a trade sale or an IPO. The exit intention may not be disclosed in full to 
the entrepreneur or even not at all. In contrast, actual exits represent realized exit outcomes 
(e.g., Cumming, 2008).  
VC contracts often imply a time-dependent evolution of decision and control rights. The 
VC relinquishes rights to interfere with operational decisions over time, but in return obtains 
valuable exit rights in the course of the financing relationship. This can be achieved by taking 
advantage of the entrepreneur’s desire to benefit from the VC’s expertise and network of 
specialist service providers at the time of exit (e.g., Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Lockett & 
Wright, 2001). The entrepreneur is further interested in benefiting from the VC’s reputation, 
which can serve as a quasi-rating and thereby increase the venture’s exit value (e.g., Lerner, 
1994; Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Neus & Walz, 2005). 
 Empirical studies confirm these theoretical postulations (see also Table 2). It has for 
instance been shown that stronger VC control rights (such as drag-along rights, board control, 
and ability to replace the founding entrepreneur as CEO) increases the likelihood of a trade 
sale rather than an IPO or a write-off. Stronger VC rights seem to be necessary to enforce the 
choice of an exit channel, which is typically the less preferred alternative of the entrepreneur 
(Cumming, 2008; Cumming & Johan, 2008; Bienz & Walz, 2010). Moreover, VC control is 
found to negatively co-vary with the expected duration of the contractual relationship (Bienz 
& Walz, 2010). At the same time, the implicit assumption that VC exit rights are fully 
respected is questioned by new evidence showing that exit rights can be renegotiated when 
corporate law gives common shareholders more advantage and when VCs lack board control 
(e.g., Fried & Broughman, 2007; Broughman & Fried, 2010). 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
The VC market involves early-stage (and therefore high-risk) investments and is made 
up of active investors. VCs have to cope with a large array of potential incentive conflicts 
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ranging from adverse selection and window dressing to moral hazard and hold-up by either 
contracting parties. While theoretical research reaches back nearly 25 years, it has long lacked 
satisfying empirical support. The situation has changed as the literature started to refocus 
from survey-based work to inquiries utilizing hand-collected datasets of contracting practices. 
Still, empirical research continues to struggle with the opaqueness of the VC industry and the 
reluctance of practitioners to share first-hand data. 
The present review article draws on the findings of seminal theoretical and empirical 
contributions on venture capital contracting practices to arrive at a number of conclusions 
relevant for the shaping of future research. 
First, a wide array of theoretical research on security choice contingent on the type of 
entrepreneurial firm suggests that VCs ought to select the financial instrument in accordance 
with the agency problems that the contract is designed to tackle. Adverse selection risks are 
for example much more pronounced for startup firms than for expansion-stage firms and more 
for high-tech firms than for non–high-tech firms. There however appears to be no consistent 
theoretical explanation for the heterogeneous mix of securities that researchers find in 
practice. One stream finds the almost universal use of convertible securities in the US, which 
is seemingly inconsistent with the hypothesis that securities are chosen based on agency cost 
differences18. Another stream finds that the situation outside the US is more varied. While the 
most compelling explanation for the heterogeneous mix of securities choices in VC financing 
contracts is based on agency cost differences (e.g., Cumming, 2006; Cumming & Johan, 
2009), recent research highlights other factors such as tax differences (e.g., Gilson & Schizer, 
2003), institutional sophistication, learning differences, and differences in stock market 
conditions (e.g., Cumming & Johan, 2009). These contributions provide fruitful direction for 
                                                 
18
 We thank an anonymous reviewer who has pointed out that whilst it is true that almost all US contracts use 
convertible preferred stock in some form, this security is merely a “shell security” that allows for large flex-
ibility in security design. The VC could design a convertible that is essentially equivalent to common stock 
(full participation, low liquidation preference, no cumulative dividends) and another convertible that is 
equivalent to debt (no participation, high liquidation preference and cumulative dividends). Existing re-
search shows that this contract design is strongly linked to agency costs. 
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future theoretical and empirical work. Most empirical papers are based on U.S. or Canadian 
data sets. Broadening the geographical coverage would provide an enhanced understanding of 
the context-dependent nature of contracting practices.  
Moreover, choice of security is either independent of or goes hand-in-hand with the 
contractual specification of cash flow and control rights. A broad stream of theoretical 
research suggests that selection effects are predominantly associated with security choice at 
the outset, not the underlying terms of contracts that must be negotiated and fine-tuned (e.g., 
Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; DeMeza & Webb, 1987; 1992). However, this research still requires 
empirical validation. A useful future research agenda would explore how the use of securities 
choice, cash flow rights (such as staging), and control rights – when employed as substitutes 
or complements – relates to entrepreneurial types. 
Further, VCs use staging to structure the supply of funding and employ control rights 
(decision and veto rights) to manage the entrepreneur’s incentives. Control rights are 
commonly contingent on financial as well as non-financial performance and help to enlarge 
the VC’s influence in adverse conditions to mitigate agency problems emanating from ex ante 
contracting. VCs set strong contingent cash flow incentives through staging and performance-
sensitive compensation. Theoretical research on staging nowadays focuses on the optimality 
of milestone versus round-based financing, which still requires empirical testing. Specifically, 
we still need insights on the relative importance of entrepreneurial and VC effort, the role of 
venture type and institutional contexts (e.g., Cuny & Talmor, 2005).  
Gompers (1995) and other seminal contributions have shown that staging is especially 
employed to control entrepreneurial effort in industries characterized by severe agency 
problems (e.g., higher levels of asset intangibility, greater R&D intensity, higher market-to-
book ratio).  More recent empirical work tests the notion that VCs assess the costs of staging 
(e.g., negotiation, contracting costs, induced short-termism of entrepreneurs, and lags in 
project implementation) relative to the costs of monitoring the entrepreneur. As Tian (2011) 
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has shown with U.S. data, staging and monitoring are substitutable for short geographical 
distances between VC and venture headquarter but that stage financing becomes more 
frequent as distance increases. This practice is also strongly associated with financial 
performance. Future work should examine these issues in different country settings.  
Control rights, such as board involvement and specified decision and veto rights, are 
used to incentivize the entrepreneur and to prevent undesirable behavior. Theoretical 
predictions on the use of control rights have moved from the allocations of formal control 
based on given contingencies to the consideration of actual interference (e.g., Dessein, 2005). 
While surrender of formal control by the entrepreneur is premised on the usefulness of 
signaling project quality, further empirical research is needed to examine the effect of actual 
interference on contracting practices. VCs use covenants to efficiently separate cash flows 
from control in order to reign in on the founder’s private benefits of control. Although some 
clauses can functionally substitute certain attributes of financial instruments, they are mainly 
applied complementarily. For example, the finding that more experienced VCs make less use 
of contractual clauses to protect their returns on the downside suggests that they use their 
monitoring capabilities to obtain better contractual concessions elsewhere. A great deal of 
additional empirical research is required to study what form these concessions can take. Do 
they for instance bring about greater board representation or better exit provisions? Overall, 
the use of covenants appears to be quite prevalent internationally but more research is 
required in different national contexts, mainly in Europe and emerging markets. 
In addition, there only exists rather scant empirical evidence on effort provision of VCs 
and entrepreneurs in relation to contracts. Data quality is the main hindering factor because of 
the difficulty of measuring effort proxies such as actual hours expended by the VC (a notable 
exception is Cumming & Johan, 2007). Although we know that greater VC control rights is 
associated with greater VC effort, both in terms of value-added services and interventions, 
there is ample scope for studies with better data sets and a broader array of countries. 
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Further, theoretical and empirical treatments of how contract design is related to exits 
provide a strong test of contract formation theories (Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Hellmann, 
2006). These contributions demonstrate that VCs negotiate for stronger control rights in 
anticipation of a need of forcing the entrepreneur to acquiesce to an acquisition. Future 
research directions on this issue should include more theoretical and empirical work on how 
bargaining power and legal conditions influence contract design (security choice and control 
rights) with respect to exits (e.g., Cumming & Johan, 2009; Broughman & Fried, 2010). More 
research with finer-grained data is desirable to study the performance impact of VC 
preplanned exit strategies and their disclosure to the entrepreneur versus instances without 
disclosure (e.g., Cumming, 2008). We also still lack a good understanding whether and how 
portfolio size differences affect preplanned exits. Finally, more work is needed to analyze the 
linkage between staging, syndication of VC investments and preplanned exits (e.g., Cumming 
& Johan, 2009). 
 When considering the performance implications of contract design, past research has 
shown that the use of convertible preferred equity is associated with higher internal rates of 
returns (IRRs) as well as with smaller deviations of self-reported, non-realized IRRs of live 
investments from subsequently realized IRRs (e.g., Cumming & Walz, 2010).  
Contractual terms, also account for differences in behavior that may influence key 
outcomes, such as the rate of innovation through the efforts of entrepreneurs or VCs (e.g., 
Metric & Yasuda, 2010), as well as indirectly through exit outcomes—a topic that requires 
extensive future study. 
Finally, there is only very limited evidence on contracting behavior outside of the U.S. 
This stands in stark contrast to the growing significance of these VC markets. Data 
availability is certainly a problem in Europe due to a scattered cross-national marketplace, 
implying that the continent is severely under-researched from our perspective. Future 
empirical work can deliver evidence on the presence of contractual differences due to legal, 
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fiscal, and institutional factors. It may further be possible to document intertemporal learning 
with the underlying hypothesis that sectoral growth has led to a homogenization of 
contracting practices relative to the United States.  
 29 
REFERENCES 
Admati, A.R. & Pfleiderer, P. (1994). Robust financial contracting and the role of venture 
capitalists. The Journal of Finance, 49(2), 371-402. 
 
Aghion, P. & Bolton, P. (1992). An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting. 
The Review of Economic Studies, 59(3), 473-494. 
 
Amit, R., Brander, J. & Zott, C. (1998). Why do venture capital firms exist? Theory and 
Canadian evidence. Journal of Business Venturing, 13, 441-466. 
 
Amit, R., Glosten, L. & Muller, E. (1990). Entrepreneurial ability, venture investments, and 
risk sharing. Management Science, 36(10), 1232-1246. 
 
Baker, M. & Gompers, P.A. (1999). Executive ownership and control in newly public firms: 
The role of venture capitalists. SSRN Working Paper Series, No. 165173. 
 
Barney, J.B., Busenitz, L.W., Fiet, J.O., & Moesel, D.D. (1994). The relationship between 
venture capitalists and managers in new firms: determinants of contractual covenants. 
Managerial Finance, 20, 19-30. 
 
Bascha, A. & Walz, U. (2002). Financing practices in the German venture capital industry. 
An empirical assessment. CFS Working Paper No. 2002/08. 
 
Bengtsson, O. (2011). Covenants in venture capital contracts. Management Science, Vol. 57, 
No. 11, 1926-1943. 
 
Bengtsson, O. & Bernhardt, D. (2011). Different problem, same solution: Contract 
specialization in venture capital. Working Paper, Lund University. 
 
Bengtsson, O. & Sensoy, B.A. (2011). Investor abilities and financial contracting: Evidence 
from venture capital. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20, 477-502. 
 
 30 
Bengtsson, O. & Hand, J.R.M. (2011). CEO compensation in venture backed firms. Journal 
of Business Venturing, 26 (2011) 391-411. 
 
Berger, A.N. & Udell, G.F. (1998). The economics of small business finance: the roles of 
private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycles. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 22, 613-673 
  
Bergemann, D. & Hege, U. (1998). Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 22(6-8), 703-735. 
 
Berglöf, E. (1994). A control theory of venture capital finance. Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization, 10(2), 247-267. 
 
Bienz, C. & Hirsch, J. (2006). The dynamics of venture capital contracts. CFS Working Paper 
No. 2006/11. 
 
Bienz, C. & Walz, U. (2010). Venture capital exit rights. Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, 19(4), 1071-1116. 
 
Bigus, J. (2006). Staging of venture financing, investor opportunism and patent law. Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(7-8), 939-960. 
 
Black, B.S. & Gilson, R.J. (1998). Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: Bank 
vs. stock markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 47, 243-277. 
 
Bolton, P. & Faure-Grimaud, A. (2010). Satisficing contracts. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 77, 937-971. 
 
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M. & Hellmann, T. (2004). The changing face of the European venture 
capital industry: Facts and analysis. Journal of Private Equity, 7(2), 226-253. 
 
 31 
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M. & Hellmann, T. (2009). What is role of legal systems in financial 
intermediation? Theory and evidence. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 18(3), 
559—598. 
 
Brander, J.A., Amit, R. & Antweiler, W. (2002). Venture capital syndication: improved 
venture selection vs. the value-added hypothesis. Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy, 11(3), 423-452. 
 
Brennan, M.J., & Kraus, A. (1987). Efficient financing under asymmetric information. 
Journal of Finance, 42, 1225-1243. 
 
Broughman, B. & Fried, J. (2010). Renegotiation of cash flow rights in the sale of VC-backed 
firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 95(3), 384-399. 
 
Casamatta, C. (2003). Financing and advising: optimal financial contracts with venture 
capitalists. The Journal of Finance, 58(5), 2059-2085. 
 
Casamatta, C. & Haritchabalet, C. (2007). Experience, screening and syndication in venture 
capital investments, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16(3), 368-398. 
 
Chan, Y.S. (1983). On the positive role of financial intermediation in allocation of venture 
capital in a market with imperfect information. The Journal of Finance, 38(5), 1543-1568. 
 
Chan, Y.S., Siegel, D. & Thakor, A.V. (1990). Learning, corporate control and performance 
requirements in venture capital contracts. International Economic Review, 31(2), 365-381. 
 
Cornelli, F. & Yosha, O. (2002). Stage financing and the role of convertible securities. Review 
of Economic Studies, 70, 1-32. 
 
Cumming, D.J. (2001). The convertible preferred equity puzzle in Canadian venture capital 
finance. Working Paper, University of Alberta School of Business. 
 
 32 
Cumming, D.J. (2005a). Agency costs, institutions, learning and taxation in venture capital 
contracting. Journal of Business Venturing, 20, 573-622. 
 
Cumming, D.J. (2005b). Capital structure in venture finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 
11, 550-585. 
 
Cumming, D.J. (2006). Adverse selection and capital structure: Evidence from venture 
capital. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30, 155-184. 
 
Cumming, D.J. (2008). Contracts and exits in venture capital finance. Review of Financial 
Studies. 21, 1947-1982. 
 
Cumming, D.J. & Johan, S.A. (2007). Advice and monitoring in venture capital finance. 
Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, 21, 3-43. 
 
Cumming, D.J. & Johan, S.A. (2008). Preplanned exit strategies in venture capital. European 
Economic Review, 52, 1209-1241. 
 
Cumming, D.J. & Johan, S.A. (2009). Venture capital and private equity contracting: An 
international perspective. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Academic Press. 
 
Cumming, D.J., Schmidt, D. & Walz, U. (2010). Legality and venture governance around the 
world. Journal of Business Venturing, 25(1), 54-72. 
 
Cuny, C.J. & Talmor, E. (2005). The staging of venture capital financing: Milestone vs. 
rounds. Working Paper, Texas A&M University and London Business School. 
 
De Clercq, D. & Sapienza, H.J. (2001). The creation of relational rents in venture capitalist-
entrepreneur dyads. Venture Capital. 3(2), 107-127. 
 
DeMeza, D., & Webb, D.C. (1987). Too much investment: a problem of asymmetric 
information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 281-292. 
 
 33 
DeMeza, D., & Webb, D.C. (1992). Efficient credit rationing. European Economic Review, 
36, 1277-1290. 
 
Da Rin, M., Hellmann, T.F. & Puri, M. (2013). A survey of venture capital research, 
Forthcoming in George Constantinides, Milton Harris, and René Stulz (eds.) Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance, vol 2, Amsterdam, North Holland  
 
Dessein, W. (2005). Information and control in ventures and alliances. The Journal of 
Finance, 60(5), 2513-2549. 
 
Dewatripont, M. & Tirole, J. (1994). A theory of debt and equity: Diversity of securities and 
manager-shareholder congruence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(5), 1027-1054. 
 
Diamond, D.W. (1991). Monitoring and reputation: The choice between loans and directly 
placed debt. The Journal of Political Economy, 99 (4) 689-7. 
 
Fried, J.M. & Broughman, B.J. (2007). Deviations from contractual priority in the sale of VC-
backed firms, American Law & Economics Association Papers. 40, 1-61  
 
Fried, J.M. & Ganor, M. (2006). Agency costs of venture capitalist control in startups, New 
York, University Law Review, 81, 967-1025 
 
Fried, V.H. & Hisrich, R.D. (1988). Venture capital research: Past, present and future. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 13(1), 15-28. 
 
Gilson, R.J. & Schizer, D.M. (2003). Understanding venture capital structure: A tax 
explanation for convertible preferred stock. Harvard Law Review, 116, 874-916. 
 
Gorman, M. & Sahlman, W. (1989). What do venture capitalists do? Journal of Business 
Venturing, 4, 231-248. 
 
Gompers, P.A. (1995). Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital. 
The Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1461-1489. 
 34 
 
Gompers, P.A. (1997). Ownership and control in entrepreneurial firms: An examination of 
convertible securities in venture capital investments. Working Paper, Harvard Business 
School. 
 
Gompers, P.A. & Lerner, J. (1996). The use of covenants: An empirical analysis of venture 
partnership agreements. Journal of Law and Economics, 39, 463-498. 
 
Gompers, P.A. & Lerner, J. (1998). Venture capital distributions: Short-run and long-run 
reactions. The Journal of Finance, 53(6), 2161-2183. 
 
Gompers, P.A. & Lerner, J. (2001). The venture capital revolution. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15(2), 145-168. 
 
Green, R.C. (1983). Investment incentives, debt, and warrants. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13, 115-136. 
 
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994). A theory of debt based on the alienability of human capital. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 841-879. 
 
Hege, U., Palomino, F. & Schwienbacher, A. (2009). Venture capital performance: The 
disparity between Europe and the United States, Finance, 30(1), 7-50. 
 
Hellmann, T. (1998). The allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts. RAND 
Journal of Economics, 29(1), 57-76. 
 
Hellmann, T. (2006). IPOs, acquisitions and the use of convertible securities in venture 
capital. Journal of Financial Economics, 81(3), 649-679. 
 
Hellmann, T. & Puri, M. (2002). Venture capital and the professionalization of startup firms: 
Empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance, 57(1), 169-197. 
 
 35 
Holstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1) 
74-91. 
 
Hommel, U., Ritter, M. & Wright, M. (2003). Verhalten der Beteiligungsfinanzierer nach dem 
“Downturn”—Ergebnisse einer empirischen Studie. Finanz Betrieb, 5, 323-333. 
 
Houben, E. (2002). Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral 
hazard. SSRN Working Paper Series, No. 365841. 
 
Hsu, D. (2004). What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation? The Journal of 
Finance, 59, 1805-1844. 
 
Inderst, R. & Müller, H.M. (2004). The effect of capital market characteristics on the value of 
startup firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 72, 319-356. 
 
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
 
Kanniainen, V. & Keuschnigg, C. (2003). The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture 
capital finance. Journal of Corporate Finance. 9(5), p521-534 
 
Kanniainen, V. & Keuschnigg, C. (2004). Start-up investment with scarce venture capital 
support. Journal of Banking & Finance. 28(8), 1935-1959. 
 
Kaplan, S.N., Martel, F. & Strömberg, P. (2007). How do legal differences and experience 
affect financial contracts? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16, 273-311. 
 
Kaplan, S.N. & Strömberg, P. (2003). Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An 
empirical analysis of venture capital contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 70, 281-315. 
 
Kaplan, S.N. & Strömberg, P. (2004). Characteristics, contracts and actions: Evidence from 
venture capital analyses. Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2177-2210. 
 
 36 
Kirilenko, A.A. (2001). Valuation and control in venture finance. The Journal of Finance, 
56(2), 565-587. 
 
Landstrom, H., Manigart, S., Mason, C., & Sapienza, H. (1998). Contracts between 
entrepreneurs and investors: terms and negotiation process. In Reynolds, P.D., Bygrave, 
W.D., Carter, N.M., Manigart, S., Mason, C.M., Meyer, G.D. & Shaver, K.G. (Eds.), 
Frontiers of entrepreneurship research (pp. 571-585). Wellesley, MA: Babson College. 
 
Lazear, E. (1986). Incentive contracts. NBER Working Papers 1917. 
 
Lerner, J. (1994). The syndication of venture capital investments. Financial Management, 
23(3), 16-27. 
 
Lerner, J. (1995). Venture capitalists and the oversight of private firms. The Journal of 
Finance, 50(1), 301-318. 
 
Lockett, A. & Wright, M. (2001). The syndication of venture capital investments. The 
International Journal of Management Science, Omega, 29, 375-390. 
 
Manigart, S., Lockett, A., Meuleman, M., Wright, M., Landström, H., Bruining, H., et al. 
(2006). Venture capitalists’ decision to syndicate. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
30(2), 131-153. 
 
Marx, L.M. (1998). Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity. Review of 
Economic Design, 3(4), 371-387. 
 
Mayer, C., Schoors, K., & Yafeh, Y. (2005). Sources of funds and investment activities of 
venture capital funds: evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the United Kingdom. Jour-
nal of Corporate Finance. 11(3), 586-608. 
 
Metric, A. & Yasuda, A. (2010). Venture capital and the finance of innovation. New York, 
John Wiley & Sons, 2nd Edition. 
 
 37 
Meuleman, M., Wright, M., Manigart, S. & Lockett, A. (2009). Private equity syndication: 
Agency costs, reputation and collaboration. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 36(5-
6), 616-644. 
 
Neher, D.V. (1999). Staged financing: An agency perspective. Review of Economic Studies, 
66, 255-274. 
 
Neus, W. & Walz, U. (2005). Exit timing of venture capitalists in the course of an initial pub-
lic offering, Journal of Financial Intermediation. 14(2), 253-277 
 
Noe, T.H. & Rebello, M.J. (1996). Asymmetric Information, Managerial Opportunism, Fi-
nancing, and Payout Policies. Journal of Finance. 51(2), 637-660. 
 
Ravid, S.A. & Bengtsson, O. (2011). Geography and style in private equity contracting: 
Evidence from the U.S. venture capital market. Working Paper: SSRN: 1782382. 
 
Repullo, R. & Suarez, J. (2004). Venture capital finance: A security design approach. Review 
of Finance, 8, 75-108. 
 
Ross, S.A. (1977). The determination of financial structure: The incentive-signalling 
approach, The Bell Journal of Economics, 8(1) 23-40. 
 
Sahlman, W. (1990). The structure and governance of venture capital organizations. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 27, 473-521. 
 
Sapienza, H.J., Manigart, S. & Vermeir, W. (1996). Venture capitalist governance and value 
added in four countries. Journal of Business Venturing, 11, 439-469. 
 
Schmidt, K.M. (2003). Convertible securities and venture capital finance. The Journal of 
Finance, 58(3), 1139-1166. 
 
Schwienbacher, A. (2008). Venture capital investment practices in Europe and the United 
States. Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, 22, 195-217  
 38 
 
Stiglitz, J., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. 
American Economic Review, 73, 393-409. 
 
Tian, X. (2011). The causes and consequences of venture capital stage financing. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 101, 132-159. 
 
Trester, J.J. (1998). Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 22(6-8), 675-99. 
 
Tykvova, T. (2007). What do economists tell us about venture capital contracts? Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 21(1), 65-89. 
 
Wang, S. & Zhou, H. (2004). Staged financing in venture capital: Moral hazard and risks. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(1), 131-155. 
 
Wasserman, N. (2006). Stewards, agents, and the founder discount: Executive compensation 
in new ventures. Academy of Management Journal, 49(5), 960-976. 
 
Wilson, R. (1968). The theory of syndicates. Econometrica, 36(1), 119-32. 
 
Wright, M., Pruthi, S. & Lockett, A. (2005). International venture capital research: From 
cross-country comparisons to crossing countries. International Journal of Management 
Reviews, 7(3), 135-165. 
 
Wright, M. & Robbie, K. (1998). Venture capital and private equity: A review and synthesis. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 25(5-6), 521-570. 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
Table 1 
Summary of terms that appear in VC Contracts 
Term Description 
Security  
Common Stock share of a company’s equity that gives the holder specified rights such 
as voting rights at the shareholder’s meeting and participation of paid 
dividends 
Preferred Stock share of a company’s equity that typically gives the holder the right of 
specified payments in excess of common stocks but doesn’t allow him 
to vote on the shareholder’s meetings 
Convertible Pre-
ferred Stock 
share of a company’s equity that gives the holder the right to exchange 
his stocks into common stocks and is preferred in case of bankruptcy 
and dividend payments 
Shareholder Loan junior debt instrument of a company which is granted by its sharehold-
ers and fulfills pre-specified payments at pre-specified dates 
Debt / Bond loan to a company with pre-specified maturity which gives the holder 
the right of pre-specified payments at pre-specified dates and in case of 
bankruptcy the right to take over the company 
Convertible Debt loan to a company with pre-specified maturity and payments at pre-
specified dates which gives the holder the right to convert it into a pre-
determined number of common stocks  
Silent Partnerships capital contribution to a company with only limited liability up to the 
invested capital and sometimes partner guides the management 
Veto Rights  
Veto Asset Sales veto right of the VC firm to forbid asset sales 
Veto Changes to 
Shareholder’s 
Agreement 
veto right of the VC firm to change shareholder’s agreement 
Veto Sale of 
Shares 
veto right of the VC firm to prohibit the company to sell shares in order 
maintain the own voting power 
Veto Capital Struc-
ture 
veto right of the VC firm to changes in the capital structure of a compa-
ny in order to stabilize already promised covenants 
Veto Profit Distri-
bution 
veto right of the VC firm to changes in the profit distribution of a com-
pany in order to maintain the specified payments and rights of the VC 
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firm 
Veto Company 
Dissolution 
veto right of the VC firm to forbid the dissolution of a company when 
the VC firm has alternative solutions for the company 
Veto Acquisition / 
Sales 
veto right of the VC firm to forbid the acquisition or sale of subsidiaries 
Veto Business Plan veto right of the VC firm to changes in the existing business plan 
Veto Head Count veto right of the VC firm to changes in the number of employees 
Control Rights  
Management Re-
placement Clause 
clause that enables the VC firm to exchange the current management 
which often consists of the company founders 
Voting  
Voting Rights pre-specified voting rights in percent assigned independently of the 
share of equity to the different parties involved in the company; VC 
firm, founder, non-founder management, others 
Board  
Board Rights pre-specified rights in percent assigned to the different parties in the 
board; VC firm, founder, non-founder management, others 
Board Seats pre-specified number of seats assigned to the different parties in the 
board; VC firm, founder, non-founder management, others 
Exit Rights  
IPO Participation 
Rights 
right of the VC firm to sell parts of the allotted shares in an IPO 
Registration Rights right of a shareholder to participate in the registration of the issuer’s 
stock for resale in the public market 
Drag Along Rights rights pursuant to which minority shareholders are required to sell their 
securities in connection with a sale by the majority shareholders 
Lock-Up initial shareholders not allowed to sell their shares at exit without con-
sent of investors 
Tag Along Rights right of investors to include their minority stock in any sale of stock by 
majority shareholders 
Right of First Re-
fusal 
right, which is granted to any shareholder, to purchase shares held by 
other shareholders before these shares may be sold to a third party 
Preemption Rights right of an investor to participate in a financing round in order to main-
tain his percentage of ownership 
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Redemption Rights the right of the VC firm to sell back shares to the entrepreneur at a pre-
specified price and after a pre-specified period of time 
Post-IPO Lock-Up pre-specified period of time after IPO in which investment may not be 
sold 
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Table 2 
Summary of Empirical Studies on Venture Capital Contracting and Implications for 
Entrepreneurship Research 
 
VC structure and entrepreneurial firm type 
  
Author(s) Sample 
Description 
Data Source Timeline Main Findings 
Trester (1998) 8 venture 
capital firms 
each with at 
least $250m 
under 
management 
and over 100 
deals and a 
sample of 800 
financing deals 
Survey Not 
reported 
Preferred equity 
dominates early-stage 
financing (96.4%) and 
debt and common equity 
financing used more in 
later-stage financing 
Cumming 
(2005a) 
12,363 
Canadian and 
US venture 
capital (VC) 
and private 
equity 
financings of 
Canadian 
entrepreneurial 
firms 
 
Macdonald and 
Associates (Toronto) 
1991 to 
2003 
Study concludes that 
selection of security 
depends mainly on 
factors such as agency 
costs, tax, and market 
conditions, but less so 
on sophistication and 
learning factors. 
Moreover, unlike US-
based studies, forms of 
preferred equity are not 
as frequently used  
Cumming 
(2005b) 
3,083 
Canadian 
corporate and 
limited 
partnership 
venture 
financing 
transactions 
 
Macdonald and 
Associates (Toronto) 
1991 to 
2000 
Study finds that seed-
stage firms are more 
likely to be financed 
with either common 
equity or straight 
preferred equity, and 
less likely to be financed 
with straight debt, 
convertible debt, or 
mixes of debt and 
common equity. High-
tech firms more likely to 
be financed with 
convertible preferred 
equity. 
 
Cummings 
(2006) 
4,114 first 
round 
Canadian VC 
financing 
Macdonald and 
Associates 
(Toronto); CVCA 
1991 (Q1) 
to 2003 
(Q3) 
Startup-stage firms more 
likely to be attracted by 
offers of debt financing 
rather than common 
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transactions  equity. Similarly, high-
tech firms more likely to 
opt for debt financing 
rather than convertible 
preferred equity 
Kaplan and 
Stromberg 
(2007) 
145 
investments in 
107 companies 
in 23 non-US 
countries by 
70 different 
lead VCs: 
VC or institutional 
investor documents 
and surveys  
1992 to 
2001 
Study finds that fewer 
than 54% of non-US 
financings employed 
convertible preferreds. 
More experienced VCs 
are more likely to 
employ US-style 
contracts irrespective of 
legal regime and obtain 
better results.  
 
How VC contracting affects entrepreneur and VC effort 
 
Sahlman 
(1990) 
40 stock 
purchasing 
agreements 
from a broad 
range of VC 
partnerships 
Venture Economics 
and field research 
over eight years 
1980 to 
1988 
VCs manage uncertainty 
and information 
asymmetry problems by 
staging the commitment 
of capital, basing 
compensation on value 
created, and preserving 
mechanisms to force 
agents to distribute 
capital and profits 
Gompers 
(1997) 
Random 
sample of 50 
convertible  
financings by 
venture capital 
firms  
Aeneas Fund at 
Harvard 
Management 
Company. 
COMPUSTAT 
 
 
December 
1988 
VCs use convertible 
securities to secure their 
investment cash flows 
and to incentivize the 
entrepreneur. Covenants 
provide the VC with 
control rights, whose 
use increases with 
potential agency costs 
i.e. in early stage firms, 
industries with high 
R&D expenditures and 
high market-to-book 
ratios 
Kaplan and 
Stromberg 
(2003) 
213 VC 
investments in 
119 portfolio 
companies by 
14 VC firms  
Contractual 
agreements, business 
plan and survey 
1992 to 
1999 
VCs separately allocate 
cash flow rights, board 
rights, voting rights, 
liquidation rights, and 
other control rights to 
retain or relinquish 
control based on firm 
performance. 80% of the 
213 investments employ 
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convertible preferred 
equity  
Kaplan and 
Stromberg 
(2004) 
67 portfolio 
investments by 
11 venture 
capital firms  
Contractual 
agreements, business 
plan and survey  
1992 to 
1999 
Study finds higher risk 
is associated with more 
VC control and more 
contingent 
compensation. VCs are 
more likely to intervene 
as VC control increases. 
VC value-added 
services increase with 
VC equity but not 
related to VC control. 
Cumming and 
Johan (2007) 
121 investment 
rounds in 74 
entrepreneurial 
firms from 14 
VC funds in 7 
continental 
European 
countries  
Mail survey and 
follow-up interview 
of VC fund members 
of the European 
Venture Capital 
Association  
 Study finds that 
preferred equity holders, 
higher perceived risk, 
and early-stage firms are 
associated with better 
advice. There is no link 
between contract design 
and conflict effort, but 
legality reduces conflict.  
Schwienbacher 
(2008) 
600 VCs in 6 
European 
countries and 
600 VCs in the 
US 
Survey 2001 European VCs are three 
times less likely than 
their US counterparts to 
use convertible  
securities and have 
longer round times, 
suggesting their less 
active involvement in 
their portfolio 
companies 
Bengtsson and 
Sensoy (2011) 
646 private-
partnership 
VCs in 1,266 
start-up 
companies 
over 1,534 
investment 
rounds  
Private Equity 
consulting firm VC 
experts 
2004 and 
2007 
Study finds that more 
experienced VCs would 
rather more frequently 
join boards of their 
portfolio companies and 
pay less attention to 
downside-protecting 
contractual cash flow 
rights than would less 
experienced VCs  
 
How VC contracting affects entrepreneurial firm outcomes 
 
Cumming 
(2008) 
223 VC IPO-
acquisition 
transactions of 
35 European 
VC funds 
spanning 11 
Survey and interview 
method plus study 
and analysis of 
actual contracts 
1995 and 
2005  
VC use of common 
equity associated with 
weak control rights in 
contrast to preferred 
securities. Ex ante 
stronger VC control 
 45 
European 
countries  
rights increase the 
likelihood that an 
entrepreneurial firm will 
exit by acquisition, 
rather than through a 
write-off or an IPO.  
Cumming & 
Johan (2008) 
223 
entrepreneurial 
investee firms 
financed by 35 
venture capital 
funds in 11 
continental 
European 
countries  
Surveys and 
interviews with VC 
fund managers and 
review of actual 
contracts 
1995–2002 Study finds that 
preplanned acquisition 
exits are associated with 
stronger investor veto 
and control rights, when 
convertible securities 
are more likely to be 
used than common 
equity; opposite is 
observed for preplanned 
IPOs.  
Hege, 
Palomino & 
Schwienbacher 
(2009) 
146 European 
seed and early 
stage 
companies and 
a random 
sample of 233 
similar US 
companies  
Venture Economics, 
European Venture 
Capital Association, 
World Bank, 
Dealogic, Lexus-
Nexis, National 
Stock Exchanges 
1997 to 
2003 
US VC strongly 
outperform European 
peers because of greater 
efficient use of 
instruments of control 
and contingent funding 
but no evidence to show 
differences in context 
such as tax environment, 
or legal origin matter 
Bienz & Walz 
(2010) 
Random 
Sample of 464 
contracts from 
290 different 
portfolio firms 
and 91 VC 
firms from 
Germany 
KfW Bankengruppe 
(formerly 
Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau) in 
Frankfurt, Germany 
1990 to 
2004 
Study finds that trade 
sale rights matter more 
than IPO rights, 
specifically drag-along 
and tag-along rights 
predominantly allocated 
to VCs. Use of these 
rights linked to 
indications of hold-up 
problems in case of exit.  
Broughman & 
Fried (2010) 
Hand-collected 
data set of 50 
VC-backed 
Silicon Valley 
high-tech firms 
VentureReporter.net 
and survey 
2003 to 
2004 
Of the 50 VCs exiting as 
preferred shareholders, 
39 VCs receive their full 
cash flow rights, 11 VCs 
carve out 11% of their 
cash flow rights to 
common shareholders—
a situation whose 
likelihood increases 
when common 
shareholders have more 
power vis-a-vis VCs.  
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